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Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of firm openness and bribery on 
bank lending decisions. Using World Bank data covering 1869 private firms, we 
find evidence that paying bribes helps firms obtain bank credit in China. But 
after adding firm openness into the analysis, the significance of the effect of 
bribery on banking finance disappears. Instead, we find that banks in China 
prefer to allocate loans to firms with a higher level of openness. This finding 
holds true only for large firms, manufacturing firms, and firms located in regions 
with good banking development. We also find that private firms with greater 
government assistance are more likely to obtain bank loans, and more credit 
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1. Introduction 
China has a predominantly state-owned banking system, which features an enormous, 
underdeveloped banking sector controlled mainly by the largest state-owned banks. For a 
considerably long period, the main role of banks in China was to carry out policy lending 
following the government’s instruction, rather than to operate in line with commercial 
considerations (Brandt and Li, 2003). Consequently, the financial resources from the 
banking sector are mostly controlled by the government and used to support state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), and the development of private sector has been hampered by limited 
access to banking finance (Bai et al., 2006; Dong et al., 2014). This paper aims to 
investigate the determinants affecting banks’ lending decisions when allocating loans to 
private firms.  
Corruption in the financial sector in China is not unusual. Pei (2008) and Chen et al. 
(2013) document the prevalence of bribes or kickbacks for loan approvals by banks over a 
lengthy period. Considering the superior bargaining power of banks in the 
borrowing–lending relationship, one might expect that in China, private firms paying bribes 
to bank officials more easily access banking finance and obtain more bank credit. However, 
Huang and Rice (2012) among others, argue that as China has been increasingly open and 
market-oriented, firm ‘openness’ becomes an important, yet poorly exploited factor in 
explaining some of financing behaviors.  
The concept of firm openness was first introduced by Laursen and Salter (2003), which 
states that openness is a strategy for firms to search external sources of information. A 
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firm’s openness not only exhibits its enhanced engagement in inter-organizational 
networking and collaboration, such as knowledge exchange between firms and other 
economic agents like business partners and cooperated universities or research institutions 
(Laursen and Salter 2006, Economist Intelligence Unit, 2009; Zhang, 2009; Huang and 
Rice, 2012), but also increases information disclosure to outsiders, including banks.  
In this paper, we use data from the World Bank to investigate the effects of firm 
bribery and firm openness on bank lending decisions towards private firms in China. Our 
sample consists of 1869 private Chinese firms, derived from the China: Investment Climate 
Survey 2003. We believe this dataset is suitable for the discussion of this paper since we 
aim to investigate that after China’s entry to World Trade Organization in 2001, whether 
bank officials had concentrated on screening borrowers for quality or asking for bribes. The 
answer to this question can help to reflect the impacts of the market-oriented reform of the 
banking sector.  
We find supportive evidence on the role of firm bribery in helping private firms obtain 
bank credit, when the effect of firm openness is ignored. However, once firm openness is 
considered, the significance of firm bribery disappears. Our baseline regression shows a 
positive relation between firm openness and banking finance, which is consistent with the 
notion that openness reduces information asymmetry. The effect is not only statistically 
significant but also economically relevant. For example, a one standard deviation increase 
in firm openness is associated with a 36.79 per cent increase in the size of banking finance 
relative to its sample mean. From sub-sample tests, we find that firm openness only 
improves access to banking finance for large firms, manufacturing firms and firms located 
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in regions with good banking development. The results are robust to alternative measures 
of openness and bribery, different econometric specifications and considerations of 
endogeneity issues.  
This study contributes to the literature in the following respects. We provide the first 
empirical evidence on the impact of firm openness on firms’ bank debt. Among the studies 
exploring the bank-firm relationship, a literature stream documents the positive impact of 
bribery on firms’ bank debt (e.g., Chen et al. (2013) and Fungáčová et al. (2015)). 
Compared with these studies, this paper further introduces the factor of firm openness in 
addition to bribery based on the notion that firms become more open by communicating 
with other firms and organizations and in the process release more information to lenders, 
and thus facilitates firms’ bank borrowing.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the literature on 
the determinants of banks’ lending decisions and develop our hypotheses. Section 3 
discusses the sample processing and research design. We present key empirical findings in 
Section 4 and conclude in Section 5. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1. Bribery and bank financing 
Focusing on country-level corruption, which is normally defined as the abuse of public 
office for private gain, several studies investigate the effect of corruption on bank credit but 
find mixed results. For example, Weill (2011) finds country-level corruption reduces bank 
credit and he attributes his finding to the reason that more corruption indicates a lower 
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quality of the legal institutions that protect banks and enforce contracts. In contrast, Fan et 
al. (2012) document that firms in more corrupt countries tend to use more debt.  
Apart from country-level corruption, corruption can also take place within the lending 
process through bribing bank officials to obtain bank loans (Fan et al., 2012; Beck et al., 
2006). Regarding the firm-level relationship between bribery and bank debt, Fungáčová et 
al. (2015) find evidence that bribing bank officials facilitates firms’ access to bank loans for 
a sample of firms in 14 transition countries. As for China, its banking system has long 
featured the dominance of state ownership in banks, and the main role of banks has been to 
lend to SOEs as per the government directive (Firth et al., 2009). With the reform of the 
banking sector since mid-1990s, banks were transformed from policy tools into real market 
entities. Brandt and Li (2003), however, identify the bank discrimination problem in 
China’s financial market. Bank discrimination refers to the phenomenon of state-owned 
banks discriminating against private firms for non-profit reasons. In this institutional 
background, private firms are expected to pay bribes to bank officials and loan officers to 
obtain bank loans. In a recent study, Chen et al. (2013) provide empirical evidence that 
paying bribes contributes to an increase in a firm’s bank debt in China.  
Based on the abovementioned discussion, we propose the following hypothesis about 
the role of bribery in banks’ allocation of loans: 
H1.1: All else being equal, paying bribes to bank officials helps private firms get access to 
banking finance more easily and obtain more bank loans.  
 
6 
 
Taking bribes, however, has potential consequences for bank officials (Wu, 2005). 
First, taking bribes exposes bank officials to substantial legal risks. Bank officials involved 
in taking bribes will bear the risk of legal actions, including prosecution, fines, or even jail 
sentences against them if the bribe-taking acts are caught. Second, bank officials taking 
bribes and allocating loans to firms lacking in quality will bring substantial financial risk 
for banks and thus block their path for promotion. More specifically, if a firm’s manager 
resorts to bribery to obtain bank loans rather than show the firm’s better products or 
services, innovation activities, investment projects, or competitiveness, bank officials could 
reasonably consider this firm as an unfavorable customer and refuse to provide it with a 
loan. Otherwise, the bank bears a potential financial risk of the firm defaulting. Bank 
officials that value their reputation and/or potential promotion opportunities would be more 
reluctant to bear this kind of risk. In addition, because most banks in China, and 
state-owned banks in particular, have no incentive or tradition of providing loans to private 
firms, bank officials might find bribes not to be worth the cost of their reputation and 
career.  
Moreover, with the ongoing reform and commercialization of China’s banking sector, 
especially after China’s entry to the WTO, a stricter disciplinary system and 
performance-based incentive mechanism were introduced for bank executives and staff, 
encouraging them to manage risk and improve performance more effectively. For example, 
strict internal guidelines have been implied in the loan-making process. According to these 
guidelines, banks are required to separate the function of credit risk assessment from the 
loan management function. An important checks and balances system is also brought in to 
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ensure an efficient and effective connection between these two functions (Chen et al., 
2013).  
Therefore, we contend that bank officials might not care about private firms’ bribery 
due to their less incentive to take bribes and decreasing ability to intervene bank loan 
allocations. This leads to an alternative hypothesis regarding the bribery’s role in bank loan 
allocation process:  
H1.2: All else being equal, paying bribes to bank officials has no significant effect on 
getting access to banking finance or obtaining bank loans. 
2.2. Firm openness and bank financing 
Information asymmetries occur between the suppliers and recipients of finance where one 
party (finance recipients) has more, or better, information than the other (finance suppliers) 
does. Banks face substantial information asymmetry when screening qualified borrowers. 
The information gap between banks and firms would hamper the efficient allocation of 
financial resources, which may lead to either credit rating (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) or a 
wedge between lending and borrowing rates (King, 1986).  
As Jõeveer (2013) argues, given the newness of financial markets and general opacity 
of business connections in transition and emerging countries, problems of asymmetric 
information are expected to be especially large. Public credit registry or private credit 
bureaus are seen as important sources of information for banks to screen eligible borrowers. 
However, in China the absence of these institutions exacerbated the problem of information 
asymmetry. Laursen and Salter (2003) introduce the concept of firm openness, which may 
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influence banks’ lending decision in the situation of information asymmetry. Fontana et al. 
(2003) extend the definition of openness as a knowledge-exchange process involving the 
combination of a searching strategy with a signaling activity. An important implication of 
Fontana et al. (2003)’s definition is that the signaling role of a firm’s openness should be 
understood as an information-disclosing process by which firms inform the outside 
environment about the range of their competencies.  
In the borrowing-lending scenario, research and practice show banks make lending 
decisions based on not only ‘hard’ quantitative criteria, such as balance sheets and income 
statement information, but also ‘soft’ qualitative information like ownership structure and 
the industry situation of borrowers (Berger and Udell, 2002; Yeung, 2009). Openness, 
acting as an important form of ‘soft’ qualitative information, could help substantially to 
alleviate the level of information asymmetry and to serve as a source of decision-related 
information for bank officials. The role of firm openness is important particularly when 
lending to the private sector, in which the information asymmetry is more severe (Firth et 
al., 2009). Based on the discussions above mentioned we propose the following hypothesis: 
H2: All else being equal, the higher openness of a private firm is associated with greater 
access to bank financing and larger amount of bank loans. 
3. Sample and variables 
3.1. The sample 
The data for this study is drawn mainly from the China: Investment Climate Survey 2003 
conducted by the World Bank with support from the Enterprise Survey Organization of 
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China’s National Bureau of Statistics. The survey was conducted with 2400 responding 
firms belonging to 14 manufacturing and service sectors located in 18 cities across China. 
The survey includes firms with different legal statuses and ownership structures. Following 
Firth et al. (2009), we identify a firm as ‘private’ if the private sector owns more than 50 
per cent of its shares. According to this condition, there are 1869 private firms in our 
sample. To eliminate the possible effects of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 
and 99
th
 percentiles. 
3.2. Variables 
3.2.1. Bank financing 
Specifically, we use two measures to capture bank financing with one concerning access to 
bank loans and the other quantifying the amount of banking finance. These measures are 
based on two key questions in the survey China: Investment Climate Survey 2003. We code 
the response to the first question ‘Do you have a loan from a bank or financial institution?’ 
as 1 if the firm’s response is ‘Yes’ and 0 for ‘No’. This is denoted as access to bank 
financing. The second question asks ‘What is the amount of the line of credit’? We scale 
this response by the firm’s total assets to derive the variable ‘size of banking finance’.  
3.2.2. Bribery 
As both paying and taking bribes are illegal in China, there is no direct or observable data 
from the dataset on whether private firms actually paid bribes to bank officials for 
obtaining bank loans. Instead, we follow Cai et al. (2011) and Chen et al. (2013), and use 
the amount of entertainment and travel costs (ETC) scaled by sales as the proxy for bribery. 
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In Chinese firm accounting books, ETC is a standard expenditure item and is used 
supposedly for reimbursing normal business expenses required by firms in their normal 
operations. However, in practice, ETC not only includes expenses for legitimate travel and 
other expenses, but also covers expenditures used commonly to bribe government or bank 
officials, clients, and suppliers, or simply to account for implicit CEO pay and managerial 
excesses.  
Empirically, we generate the value of ETC based on the answer to the key question in 
the China: Investment Climate Survey 2003 that takes the following form: ‘What are the 
total travel and entertainment costs spent in 2002 by the firm?’ and ultimately scale the 
ETC by sales to proxy for the bribe payments to bank officials. In the robustness test, we 
also construct an alternative measure of bribe payments to banks and include it in the 
regression analysis (see the robustness test for details).  
3.2.3. Firm openness 
Following Laursen and Salter (2006), Zhang (2009) and Huang and Rice (2012), we proxy 
for ‘firm openness’ in a broader perspective based on the responses relating to whether or 
not the firm had engaged in any contractual or long-standing relationship with universities, 
research institutions, or other firm. Firm openness is assigned values between 0 and 3. The 
value of 0 is used for no relationship with any of the three kinds of organization, 1 when 
the relationship is with any one of the three kinds of organization, 2 when the relationship 
is with any two of the three kinds of organization and 3 when the relationship is with all 
three kinds of organizations.  
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3.2.4. Control variables 
Firth et al. (2009) find that Chinese banks extend loans to financially healthier firms. 
Following Firth et al. (2009), we use a one-year lagged return on sales (ROS) to measure 
firm performance, which is calculated using the one-year lagged earnings before interest 
and taxes divided by total sales. Research agrees that political connection is a valuable 
asset that may have a favorable effect on bank lending decisions (Dinc, 2005; Faccio et al., 
2006). In this paper, we use government help (Govt help) to measure political connection, 
which is a dummy variable if a firm’s answer to the question ‘During the year 2002, did 
any government agency or official assist you in obtaining bank financing?’ is ‘Yes’, and 0 
otherwise.  
Firth et al. (2009) find that banks tend to allocate loans to better-governed firms. In 
contrast, Yao et al. (2010) find a limited impact of the corporate governance mechanism in 
borrowers on banks’ lending decisions. In this paper, we use a group of corporate 
governance variables to assess the effect of corporate governance of private firms on 
obtaining banking finance. Specifically, manager experience is the number of years the 
general manager has held his or her position at the current firm, and manager tenure is the 
tenure of the general manager. Managerial ownership is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the general manager’s answer to the question of ‘Does the general manager own company 
stocks?’ is ‘Yes’, and 0 otherwise. Manager wage payment is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if the general manager’s wage is paid annually and 0 otherwise. Manager incentive is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the general manager’s answer to the question 
‘Does the general manager have any incentive plans linking his or her income to firm 
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performance?’ is ‘Yes’, and 0 otherwise. Board ownership is the percentage of board 
directors that own shares in the firm. Board size is the number of board directors, and board 
independence is the percentage of independent directors among the total board directors. 
Duality is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the general manager is also the chair of the 
board, and 0 otherwise.  
This paper also controls some other possible factors. Firm size is measured as the 
natural logarithm of firm total assets, and firm age is the natural logarithm of the number of 
years since the firm was established. Following Barth et al. (2009), we also include the 
variable named ‘bank competition’ to control for the reduced bargaining power of bank 
officials in a competitive market. Bank competition is defined as the natural logarithm of 
the number of banks with which a firm does business. Following Dopuch and Simiunic 
(1982) and Barth et al. (2009), we include a dummy variable (Audit) to measure the 
accuracy and reliability of firms’ financial statements. This variable equals 1 if the answer 
to the question ‘Was company financial statement audited every year? ’ is ‘Yes’, and 0 
otherwise. Since Svensson (2005) finds that higher GDP per capita is related to less 
corruption, we include the variable ‘GDP per capita’. Since the dataset that we use includes 
2400 responding firms located in 18 cities, the city-level GDP per capita is used, which is 
the natural logarithm of gross national product per capita in each city where each firm 
locates. City population is the natural logarithm of population of the city in which the firm 
is located. As Li et al. (2009) and Firth et al. (2009) find that marketization
1
 is an 
                                                        
1 Fan et al. (2012) develop a marketization index as the measurement of the regional economic development and 
institutional efficiency. Higher scores on the index indicate a relatively high level of economic development and 
institutional efficiency. Banking sector marketization is an index measuring the extent of banking sector development for 
different regions (provinces), which is one of the dimensions of the marketization index. 
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important determinant of firms’ debt financing constitution in China, we use Fan et al. 
(2012)’s banking sector marketization to measure the institutional environment. The 
influence of industries is also considered by including industry dummy variables in the 
regressions. Since region fixed effects can absorb variations related to location, we also 
include city fixed effects in the regressions and cluster the standard errors on city level. 
Table 1 describes the summary statistics of the variables in this study. Only 21.51 per 
cent of sample firms obtain loans from banks, and the proportion of bank loans to assets is 
4.8 per cent on average. Bribery, proxied for by ETC scaled by sales, has a mean of 2.42 
per cent and a median of 1.04 per cent. On average, more than half of the sample firms 
demonstrate strong financial performance. In an unreported result, we also check the 
correlations between all of the variables and find that most of the correlation coefficients 
are below 0.3 (for example, the correlation coefficient between bribery measure and 
openness measure is just 0.0289), revealing that multicollinearity is not a serious problem 
in this study.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 2 presents the univariate tests of the dependent variables based on different 
classifications of the sample. ‘Difference tests’ columns in Panel A, B and C report the t 
value for the T-test and the z value for the Wilcoxon test of differences in mean and median. 
Panel A reports the univariate test for firms with different levels of openness.  
‘Openness_0’ refers to firms having no relationship with any local university, research 
institution, or other firms; ‘Openness_1’, ‘Openness_2’ and ‘Openness_3’ refer to firms 
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having a relationship with any one, two, and all three of the three kinds of organization, 
respectively. This panel shows that increased firm openness increases the likelihood of 
obtaining banking finance, while greater firm openness assists borrowers in obtaining more 
bank credit.  
Panel B presents the univariate test for firms with and without bribe payments. 
‘Non-bribery’ and ‘Bribery’ refer to firms without and with bribe payments, respectively. 
The results suggest that paying bribes does help private firms with their banking finance, 
and provides preliminary support for Hypothesis 1.1. We test this relation in a multivariate 
framework in the following section. 
Panel C presents the univariate test for firms with low and high bribe payments. 
‘Low-bribery’ and ‘High-bribery’ refer to firms with low bribe payments (below the 
median) and high bribe payments (above the median), respectively. Interestingly, this panel 
indicates that compared with private firms that pay high bribes, those paying low bribes get 
larger access to bank financing and obtain more bank loans. This result is discussed in 
Section 4.4.3. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. The effect of private firm’s bribery on its bank financing 
To explore the impact of firm bribery on bank financing, we model a bank official’s latent 
response as follows: 
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where the subscript i indicates a firm. As defined in Section 3.2.1, the dependent variable 
bank financing measures a firm’s access to banking finance and the amount of the loan 
granted by the banks. We use Logit models for specifications where access to bank finance 
is the dependent variable, and ordinary least squares (OLS) models for those where the size 
of the bank loan is the dependent variable. The results of the effect of private firm’s bribery 
on its bank financing are shown in Table 3. We first run the regressions that include 
‘standard’ determinants of bank credit like firm profitability, size, age, bank competition 
and proxies for the macroeconomic environment including GDP per capita, city population 
and development of banking sector (see Column (1) and (2)). A set of corporate governance 
measures (see Column (3) and (4)) and bribery (see Column (5) and (6)) are added to the 
estimations subsequently.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
As seen in Column (1) and (2), firm performance measured by lagged ROS is 
positively and significantly associated with both access to and size of banking finance. This 
result is consistent with that of Firth et al. (2009), who argue that banks tend to allocate 
loans to financially healthier firms. When we add corporate governance measures into the 
estimations (see Column (3) and (4), Table 3), firm performance is positively related to 
access to banking finance and size of banking finance at 10 and 1 per cent level, 
respectively. But there is no consistently significant relation between bank debt measures 
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and governance measures. Then we add firm bribery into the analysis. As shown in 
Column (6), bribery is found to be positively and significantly related to size of banking 
finance. This result suggests that bribery plays a positive effect on helping private firms 
obtain more bank loans. 
Table 3 also shows that whether the firm’s financial statement was audited every year 
does not show a significantly positive relationship with bank financing, indicating that 
banks might not pay much attention to auditing. A positive and statistically significant 
relationship is found between government help and private firms’ bank financing. This 
reveals that political connection is an important factor for private firms in accessing bank 
financing, which is consistent with Firth et al. (2009). No significant relationship between 
bank competition and bank financing is found, which is inconsistent with the findings of 
Barth et al. (2009). This result may be due to the situation that China’s predominantly 
state-owned banking sector features substantial discrimination towards private firms. The 
coefficient of firm size is positive and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, 
revealing that larger firms are more likely to obtain bank loans.  
4.2. The effect of private firm’s openness on its bank financing 
Compared to the work done in Firth et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2013), which examines 
the effect of firm performance and bribery on bank’s lending decisions, this paper further 
investigates the effect of firm openness on bank’s lending to private firms. Thus we 
construct the following model: 
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where the subscript i indicates a firm. The dependent variable bank financing measures a 
firm’s access to banking finance and the amount of the loan granted by the banks. 
Compared with Equation (1), firm openness is added as one of the independent variables. 
We use Logit models for specifications where access to bank finance is the dependent 
variable, and OLS models for those where the size of the bank loan is the dependent 
variable. The empirical results are shown in Table 4
2
.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
When considering the potential effect of firm openness, compared to that in Table 3, 
neither ROS nor bribery is significantly related to firm’s access to banking finance (see 
Column (1), Table 4). But our variable of interest, firm openness, shows a significantly 
positive effect on firm’s access to banking finance. This result suggests that increased firm 
openness results in a greater likelihood of a firm obtaining banking finance, even after 
controlling for firm performance, bribery and other possible determinants. For the 
interaction term between bribery and openness, the insignificant coefficient indicates that 
the interaction effect between bribery and openness on a firm’s bank financing is not 
strong.  
                                                        
2 To reduce the space taken for tables, we only report the important coefficients in Table 4-7. 
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In Column (2) of Table 4, ROS is significant but bribery is insignificant when firm 
openness is included. The coefficient of openness is 0.0219, which is positive and 
significant at the 1 per cent level, indicating that firm openness could reduce the level of 
information asymmetry encountered by banks and reassure them to grant more loans. The 
effect is not only statistically significant but also economically relevant. For example, a one 
standard deviation increase in firm openness is associated with a 36.79 per cent increase in 
the size of banking finance relative to its sample mean. 
To conclude, the effect of paying bribes on obtaining bank loans disappears once the 
firm openness factor is considered, which indicates the relationship between bribery and 
bank financing found in Chen et al. (2013) might be absorbed by firm openness. In other 
words, bank officials are more informed by firm openness instead of bribe payments from 
firms when making lending decisions. Therefore, after considering firm openness, 
Hypothesis 1.1 is no longer supported, while Hypothesis 1.2 and Hypothesis 2 are 
supported.  
4.3. Sub-sample tests 
Theoretically, small firms are less transparent, which makes the information asymmetry 
issue more severe when bank officials are dealing with these firms. Therefore, banks may 
prefer large firms, which are typically more open and thus have more information sources 
available for the bank to know about the firm. Our results in Table 3 and Table 4 provide 
supportive evidence that banks allocate more credit to large firms. To take a closer look at 
the role of firm size in helping firms obtain bank loans, we split our entire sample into two 
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sub-samples by firm size following Firth et al. (2009). Specifically, a firm is categorized as 
a large (small) firm if its size is above (below) the sample median. The results are presented 
in Table 5.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Firm openness does not show a significant association with both access to banking 
finance and size of banking finance in small firms (see Column (1) and (2), Table 5). 
However, openness is related positively and significantly to bank financing, regardless of 
which bank financing measure is used in large firms (see Column (3) and (4), Table 5). 
The results suggest that openness is a more important determinant for large firms than for 
small firms in banks’ lending decisions. This might be partly because small firms usually 
have fewer opportunities to show their openness. In other words, it is difficult for small 
firms to enter into contractual or long-term relationships with other firms, universities, or 
research institutes. In both small and large firms, we find no evidence supporting bribery’s 
role in helping private firms obtain bank credits when firm openness is included. 
Firms operating in different industries might be subject to different industry conditions, 
such as industry regulations, market competition, external financial dependence, and level 
of information asymmetry (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Thus, we include a set of industry 
dummies to control for the variation among industries in Tables 3 and Table 4. 
Considering that our sample size is not large and the sample firms are not distributed 
equally, this might bias the results. Therefore, we divide the entire sample into two groups 
according to firms’ industry. Specifically, accounting and the non-banking financial 
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services, advertisement and marketing, and business services are reclassified as ‘service 
industry’, while other sectors are reclassified as ‘manufacturing industry’. The regression 
results are shown in Table 6. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
For manufacturing firms only, openness displays a positive and significant effect on 
size of banking finance (see Column (2), Table 6). The lack of significance of relationship 
between openness and bank financing for firms in the service industry might be attributed 
to the lesser need for these firms to build long-term or contractual relationships with other 
organizations. Again, we do not find supportive evidence on the role of bribery in helping 
firms obtain banking finance when firm openness is inclusive.  
Institutional environment is found to have a substantial effect on firms’ operations (e.g., 
Firth et al., 2009). Chen et al. (2006) argue that an outstanding feature of China’s economy 
is the imbalance in terms of the development of banking sector, in particular in different 
regions. Locations with better banking sector development can be expected to provide more 
opportunities for firms to acquire bank loans. To investigate the influence of banking sector 
marketization on firms’ bank financing further, we split the entire sample into a poor 
banking development group and a good banking development group. Specifically, firms are 
classified in the good (or poor) banking development group if the value of banking sector 
marketization for their location is above (or below) the sample median. The results are 
presented in Table 7.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
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As in Table 7, openness is found to have a positive and significant effect on firms’ 
bank financing only for firms located in regions with higher banking sector marketization. 
This result implies that in areas with a developed banking sector, banks have more 
incentive and skills to capture information about potential borrowers, including the 
information released through firms’ communications and collaborations with other 
organizations. Similarly, in these regions, bribery is found to have no significant effect on 
firms’ bank financing.  
4.4. Robustness tests
3
 
4.4.1. Alternative measures for bribery 
In the main test, we follow Cai et al. (2011) and Chen et al. (2013) and use the amount of 
ETC scaled by sales as the proxy for bribery. Given the fact that the amount of loan is 
scaled by total assets as one of dependent variables, we also conduct the robustness test by 
scaling bribes using total assets. Our results are robust in this case.  
In addition, similar to Beck et al. (2007) and Barth et al. (2009)’s work, we construct a 
measure of bribe payments based on the key question in relation to firms’ bribe payments. 
The question takes the following form: ‘In your dealings with bank officials and loan 
officers, was a gift or informal payment expected?’ We include a dummy that equals 1 if 
the respondent’s answer is ‘Yes’, and 0 otherwise, to measure firms’ bribe payments to 
bank officials. The empirical results are consistent with our main results.  
                                                        
3
 For brevity, the results of robustness tests are not presented but available upon request. 
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4.4.2. Alternative measures for openness 
In our paper, contractual or long-standing relationship with a university, research institution 
or other firms is used to proxy for firm openness. But most firms could have many kinds of 
connection with other firms as long as they operate, such as suppliers. To ensure our results 
are not driven by alternative measures of openness, we perform a robustness test by using 
the relationship with suppliers (the natural logarithm of the total number of suppliers of the 
key raw materials and/or the key service bought from) as a measure of firm openness. The 
results show that the alternative proxy of openness is positively associated with banking 
finance (measured by ‘size of banking finance’).  
In addition, Ricci and Trionfetti (2012) find if firms benefit from foreign networks 
(ownership and financial linkages), domestic networks (chamber of commerce, links to 
regulation), or communication networks (E-mail, internet), they are more likely to export, 
which to some extent reflect these firms are more ‘open’. Following Ricci and Trionfetti 
(2012), we use ‘foreign participation’ (measured by the percentage of the firm owned by 
the foreign private sector) and ‘joint venture of a domestic enterprise’ (a dummy variable 
taking the value 1 if the legal status of the firm is joint venture of a domestic enterprise, and 
0 otherwise) to proxy for openness from the perspectives of foreign networks and domestic 
networks. The results show that ‘joint venture of a domestic enterprise’ is positively 
associated with bank financing measured by access to banking finance, but there is no 
positive relation between bank debt and openness measured by ‘foreign participation’.  
4.4.3. Test for non-linear relationship between bribery and loans  
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The results of univariate tests in Panel C of Table 2 show that firms pay lower bribes get 
larger access to bank financing and obtain more bank loans, which reveal there might be a 
non-linear relationship between bribery and bank loans. Thus, we include bribery squared 
terms in the regressions. The results show that no matter if the bribery squared term is 
included, our main results hold.  
4.4.4. Self-selection issue 
The value of ETC might be measured with errors since we do not know for sure if a firm 
indeed paid bribes. In order to resolve this self-selection bias, we use the bribery measure 
(whether a gift or informal payment was expected while dealing with bank officials) from 
the robustness check Section 4.4.1 to instrument the main bribery measure based on ETC in 
the baseline regression, and then include the instrumental variable in the second-stage 
regression. The results show that after instrumenting the bribery measure, openness is 
consistently associated with bank debt. 
4.4.5. Endogeneity issue 
To address the possible endogeneity issue between bribery, firm openness and bank loans, 
we used the industry-city bribery (openness) averages to instrument individual firm bribes 
(openness) in the robustness test. Our results are robust after addressing this endogeneity 
concern.  
5. Conclusions 
Debt financing is the predominant source of external funds for China’s corporations, but 
the Chinese debt market is comprised of an undeveloped corporate bond market and 
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dominated by a state-owned banking sector. In this paper, using data from the World Bank 
covering 1869 private firms in China, we investigate the effects of bribery and firm 
openness on banks’ lending decisions towards private firms in China.  
Before considering the effect of firm openness, we find supportive evidence on the role 
of bribery in helping private firms obtain bank credit, which is consistent with Chen et al. 
(2013). However, after adding firm openness into our analysis, the significance of bribery 
disappears. Instead, we find that banks in China prefer to allocate loans to firms with a 
higher level of openness since higher level of openness is associated with more information 
disclosure and thus alleviate information asymmetry when banks make lending decisions. 
After conducting sub-sample tests, this finding is found to hold true only for large firms, 
manufacturing firms, and firms located in regions with good banking development. This 
result suggests that firms of these kinds may drive the positive and significant relationship 
between openness and bank financing. 
The finding that bribe payments to bank officials do not help firms as much as 
openness in obtaining banking finance has at least three important implications. First, given 
the long tradition of bribery in the Chinese context, bank officials concentrating on 
screening borrowers for quality rather than asking for bribes reflects the development of 
China’s market environment and the achievement of banking sector reform in China. 
Second, this finding encourages firms to develop long-term competitive advantages. By 
way of explanation, if managers come to believe that they can win bank loans more 
effectively through bribery rather than through improving their operational performance, 
they will potentially spend more time courting bank officials than focusing on innovation 
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activities and making better investment decisions. Such an approach would damage their 
long-term growth (Wu, 2005). Third, during a transition process from a planned economy 
to a market economy, private firms in China have the necessity to focus their endeavors on 
improving openness rather than the traditional ways, which include paying bribes. 
We also find private firms with better financial performance, of a larger size, and with 
more government assistance are more likely to obtain bank loans and loans of a greater size, 
which are consistent with the findings of Firth et al. (2009). But we do not find consistently 
supportive evidence on the role of corporate governance of private firms in obtaining bank 
loans, which supports the findings of Yao et al. (2010).
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variables Obs. Min Mean Median Max 
Standard 
deviation 
Access to banking finance 1869 0 0.2151 0 1 0.411 
Size of banking finance 1825 0 0.048 0 0.5495 0.1224 
Openness 1869 0 0.4227 0 3 0.7611 
Bribery 1823 0 0.0242 0.0104 0.25 0.0406 
Govt help 1839 0 0.1599 0 1 0.3666 
Bank competition 1795 0 0.7915 0.6931 3.6889 0.6427 
Firm size 1825 0.0953 9.4427 9.3321 17.907 2.2297 
Firm age 1869 1.0986 2.2603 2.1972 3.9703 0.7073 
ROS 1844 –1.8113 –0.0232 0.0219 0.4037 0.3213 
Audit 1869 0 0.6704 1 1 0.4702 
Manager experience 1851 0 1.536 1.6094 3.4965 0.7349 
Manager tenure 1466 0 1.4753 1.3863 3.912 0.5899 
Managerial ownership 1869 0 0.3574 0 1 0.4794 
Manager wage payment 1869 0 0.2039 0 1 0.403 
Manager incentive 1869 0 0.2755 0 1 0.4469 
Duality 1078 0 0.4889 0 1 0.5001 
Board ownership 1058 0 51.7765 60 100 43.1535 
Board size 1073 1 6.2302 5 389 12.1481 
Board independence 1073 0 0.1385 0 1 0.24 
GDP per capita 1783 9.7146 10.3958 10.4097 11.9944 0.5617 
City population 1869 4.5677 5.5322 5.3938 6.9068 0.6166 
Banking sector marketization 1869 1.46 4.9627 4.53 9.23 2.3336 
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Table 2 Univariate test 
Panel A. Univariate test of firms with different levels of openness 
 
Openness_0 Openness_1 Openness_2 Openness_3 
Difference tests 
(Openness_0–Openness_3) 
 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median t value z value 
Obs. 1329 353 124 63 
 
Access to banking finance 0.1708 0 0.2635 0 0.4435 0 0.4286 0 –5.2227*** –5.174*** 
Obs. 1292 349 122 62 
  
Size of banking finance 0.0352 0 0.0566 0 0.1298 0 0.1037 0 –4.9004*** –4.561*** 
Panel B. Univariate test of firms without and with bribe payments  
 
Non-bribery Bribery Difference tests 
 
Mean Median Mean Median t value z value 
Obs. 168 1701 
 
Access to banking finance 0.1786 0 0.2187 0 –1.2073 –1.207 
Obs. 158 1667 
  
Size of banking finance 0.0330 0 0.0494 0 –2.0042** –1.193 
Panel C. Univariate test of firms with low and high bribe payments  
 
Low-bribery High-bribery Difference tests 
 
Mean Median Mean Median t value z value 
Obs. 996 873 
 
Access to banking finance 0.2349 0 0.1924 0 2.2328** 2.230** 
Obs. 977 848 
  
Size of banking finance 0.0535 0 0.0415 0 2.0902** 2.306** 
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 3 The effect of private firms’ bribery on bank financing 
 Access to 
banking 
finance 
Size of 
banking 
finance 
Access to 
banking 
finance 
Size of 
banking 
finance 
Access to 
banking 
finance 
Size of 
banking 
finance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ROS 0.6030** 0.0252** 0.6213* 0.0267*** 0.6104* 0.0279*** 
 (0.2682) (0.0106) (0.3290) (0.0078) (0.3378) (0.0083) 
Bribery     0.2661 0.0437** 
    (3.4590) (0.0184) 
Audit -0.0654 -0.0040 0.3903* 0.0099 0.4017* 0.0100 
(0.1290) (0.0089) (0.2233) (0.0091) (0.2271) (0.0092) 
Govt help 1.1228*** 0.0554*** 1.0674*** 0.0431*** 1.0577*** 0.0428*** 
 (0.1829) (0.0107) (0.1957) (0.0132) (0.2018) (0.0133) 
Bank competition 0.1539 0.0071 0.1766 0.0041 0.1670 0.0040 
 (0.1300) (0.0067) (0.2560) (0.0094) (0.2525) (0.0094) 
Manager experience   -0.0476 -0.0004 -0.0456 -0.0002 
  (0.1001) (0.0063) (0.0985) (0.0063) 
Manager tenure   0.0965 -0.0033 0.0904 -0.0037 
  (0.2075) (0.0099) (0.2087) (0.0101) 
Managerial ownership   0.5145* 0.0084 0.5429* 0.0098 
  (0.2920) (0.0130) (0.2969) (0.0133) 
Manager wage payment   0.1554 0.0299** 0.1532 0.0296** 
  (0.2342) (0.0114) (0.2491) (0.0122) 
Manager incentive   0.1037 0.0000 0.1186 0.0010 
  (0.1295) (0.0116) (0.1242) (0.0116) 
Duality   -0.2304 -0.0018 -0.2137 -0.0008 
  (0.2147) (0.0107) (0.2261) (0.0110) 
Board ownership   0.0061* 0.0001 0.0060* 0.0001 
  (0.0031) (0.0001) (0.0032) (0.0001) 
Board size   0.0248 0.0009 0.0251 0.0008 
  (0.0335) (0.0018) (0.0345) (0.0019) 
Board independence   0.2131 0.0288 0.2604 0.0325 
  (0.3528) (0.0222) (0.3441) (0.0227) 
Firm size 0.3412*** 0.0083** 0.4440*** 0.0114*** 0.4444*** 0.0116*** 
(0.0655) (0.0029) (0.0550) (0.0024) (0.0512) (0.0023) 
Firm age -0.0316 0.0016 -0.2244* -0.0034 -0.2231* -0.0029 
(0.0818) (0.0041) (0.1215) (0.0076) (0.1156) (0.0072) 
GDP per capita -0.5462** -0.0196** -0.4560* -0.0112 -0.4369 -0.0094 
(0.2208) (0.0078) (0.2758) (0.0118) (0.2744) (0.0114) 
City population -0.6019**
* 
-0.0218**
* 
-0.4511 -0.0093 -0.4475 -0.0088 
(0.1642) (0.0053) (0.2989) (0.0110) (0.2994) (0.0111) 
Banking sector 
marketization  
0.1385*** 0.0053*** 0.0881 0.0051* 0.0868 0.0049* 
(0.0398) (0.0015) (0.0816) (0.0025) (0.0812) (0.0025) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 3.6979 0.2694** 0.1410 0.0608 -0.0985 0.0347 
 (2.8779) (0.0975) (4.0773) (0.1354) (4.0707) (0.1324) 
Observations 1600 1629 800 806 794 799 
Adjusted 
R-squared/Pseudo R2 
0.1912 0.1017 0.2421 0.1303 0.2426 0.1304 
Notes: Robust standard errors, which are clustered by city, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 4 The effect of private firms’ openness and bribery on bank financing 
 Access to banking finance Size of banking finance 
                                      (1) (2) 
ROS 0.5073 0.0221** 
 (0.3610) (0.0106) 
Bribery -2.7854 -0.0091 
 (5.0580) (0.1464) 
Openness 0.2240* 0.0219*** 
 (0.1351) (0.0068) 
Bribery×Openness 2.1814 0.0183 
 (3.7377) (0.2084) 
Audit 0.4181** 0.0110 
 (0.2118) (0.0087) 
Govt help 0.9800*** 0.0361*** 
 (0.1911) (0.0118) 
Bank competition 0.1648 0.0024 
 (0.2620) (0.0098) 
Firm size 0.4329*** 0.0102*** 
 (0.0516) (0.0021) 
Firm age -0.2617** -0.0045 
 (0.1188) (0.0071) 
GDP per capita -0.4123 -0.0067 
 (0.2663) (0.0104) 
City population -0.4700* -0.0092 
 (0.2787) (0.0099) 
Banking sector marketization 0.0878 0.0050** 
 (0.0777) (0.0023) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Constant -0.0289 0.0264 
 (3.9635) (0.1221) 
Observations 794 799 
Adjusted R-squared/Pseudo R
2
 0.2497 0.1458 
Notes: Robust standard errors, which are clustered by city, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. To reduce the space taken for tables, we only report 
the important coefficients in this table. 
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Table 5 Sub-sample analysis based on firm size 
 Small firm Large firm 
 Access to 
banking finance 
Size of banking 
finance 
Access to 
banking finance 
Size of banking 
finance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ROS 1.0893 0.0231 0.5652 0.0216 
 (0.8702) (0.0196) (0.4742) (0.0216) 
Bribery 2.3728 -0.0763 -4.5377 0.0148 
(10.6047) (0.1053) (6.7669) (0.3816) 
Openness 0.4401 -0.0025 0.2666* 0.0310*** 
(0.4840) (0.0112) (0.1404) (0.0094) 
Bribery×Openness 4.6808 0.1856 -2.0917 -0.2353 
(7.5861) (0.2319) (4.4293) (0.2519) 
Audit 1.1711** 0.0183** 0.3113 0.0062 
 (0.5163) (0.0083) (0.3821) (0.0198) 
Govt help 2.9618** 0.0414 0.7925*** 0.0355* 
 (1.4308) (0.0414) (0.2465) (0.0185) 
Bank competition 0.0150 -0.0075 0.1213 0.0016 
(0.5478) (0.0103) (0.2758) (0.0121) 
Firm size 1.1213*** 0.0044 0.4086*** 0.0142* 
 (0.3768) (0.0044) (0.1066) (0.0073) 
Firm age -1.5412** -0.0114 -0.1346 -0.0029 
(0.6005) (0.0082) (0.1013) (0.0092) 
GDP per capita -0.1355 0.0066 -0.3798 -0.0075 
(0.4409) (0.0081) (0.3017) (0.0106) 
City population -0.8729* 0.0046 -0.2792 -0.0066 
(0.5262) (0.0083) (0.2862) (0.0119) 
Banking sector marketization 0.0722 0.0005 0.0865 0.0059* 
(0.1643) (0.0029) (0.0950) (0.0030) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -4.4396 -0.0796 -1.6358 -0.0647 
 (6.1897) (0.0940) (4.7086) (0.1578) 
Observations 241 299 498 500 
Adjusted R-squared/Pseudo R
2
 0.3456 0.0315 0.1767 0.1341 
Notes: Robust standard errors, which are clustered by city, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. To reduce the space taken for tables, we only report 
the important coefficients in this table. 
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Table 6 Sub-sample analysis based on industry 
 Manufacturing Service 
 Access to 
banking finance 
Size of banking 
finance 
Access to 
banking finance 
Size of banking 
finance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ROS 0.4737 0.0305** -0.7026 0.0039 
 (0.3723) (0.0134) (1.6341) (0.0074) 
Bribery -3.6897 -0.0756 -5.0535 0.0420 
(5.5903) (0.2206) (15.2651) (0.0500) 
Openness 0.2168 0.0217** 0.5596 0.0110 
(0.1444) (0.0097) (0.5517) (0.0126) 
Bribery×Openness 2.7720 0.0692 5.2957 -0.0625 
(3.9024) (0.2406) (14.3057) (0.0932) 
Audit 0.3771* 0.0107 2.8783** 0.0073 
 (0.2217) (0.0103) (1.4102) (0.0056) 
Govt help 0.9602*** 0.0307** 4.0361** 0.0881** 
 (0.2362) (0.0118) (1.9405) (0.0318) 
Bank competition 0.1731 0.0040 1.0085 0.0015 
(0.2528) (0.0106) (1.0620) (0.0090) 
Firm size 0.4462*** 0.0126*** 0.1297 0.0026 
 (0.0483) (0.0026) (0.2193) (0.0020) 
Firm age -0.2845*** -0.0048 -1.0054 -0.0077 
(0.1085) (0.0076) (1.1351) (0.0085) 
GDP per capita -0.4869* -0.0093 1.2023 0.0073 
(0.2515) (0.0134) (1.7281) (0.0096) 
City population -0.6148*** -0.0130 2.3132 0.0085 
(0.2347) (0.0115) (1.8423) (0.0071) 
Banking sector marketization 0.0869 0.0052* 0.0909 0.0026 
(0.0711) (0.0029) (0.1731) (0.0017) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.7618 0.0477 -36.1507 -0.1471 
 (3.4670) (0.1486) (26.7025) (0.1377) 
Observations 642 647 152 152 
Adjusted R-squared/Pseudo R
2
 0.5194 0.1182 0.2104 0.2158 
Notes: Robust standard errors, which are clustered by city, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. To reduce the space taken for tables, we only report 
the important coefficients in this table. 
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Table 7 Sub-sample analysis based on the development of local banking sector 
 Poor banking development Good banking development 
 Access to 
banking finance 
Size of banking 
finance 
Access to 
banking finance 
Size of banking 
finance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ROS 1.4174** 0.0217 0.2657 0.0241 
 (0.6716) (0.0172) (0.4245) (0.0152) 
Bribery -11.8683*** -0.2268 -0.0747 0.1983 
(3.8524) (0.1720) (7.0690) (0.2351) 
Openness -0.1618 0.0060 0.4913*** 0.0376*** 
(0.2331) (0.0135) (0.1488) (0.0091) 
Bribery×Openness 13.7113** 0.3356 -5.8779** -0.3262*** 
(6.0463) (0.3459) (2.9153) (0.0886) 
Audit 0.2065 0.0090 0.2858 0.0043 
 (0.3173) (0.0120) (0.2722) (0.0124) 
Govt help 1.4587*** 0.0436*** 1.0469*** 0.0314 
 (0.3300) (0.0120) (0.3512) (0.0220) 
Bank competition 0.5431 0.0108 -0.0721 -0.0026 
(0.5250) (0.0127) (0.3257) (0.0136) 
Firm size 0.5681*** 0.0069** 0.4166*** 0.0154*** 
 (0.0890) (0.0027) (0.0860) (0.0039) 
Firm age -0.3082 0.0038 -0.2734** -0.0140* 
(0.3293) (0.0152) (0.1307) (0.0065) 
GDP per capita -1.4088*** -0.0208 -0.0640 -0.0097 
 (0.4724) (0.0147) (0.2819) (0.0104) 
City population -1.0522*** -0.0251* -0.0560 -0.0075 
(0.2850) (0.0109) (0.2743) (0.0084) 
Banking sector marketization -1.0943*** -0.0144*** 0.0009 0.0080* 
(0.2500) (0.0032) (0.1016) (0.0038) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 16.1338** 0.3257* -5.3947 0.0117 
 (6.6376) (0.1626) (4.5599) (0.1521) 
Observations 358 363 404 436 
Adjusted R-squared/Pseudo R
2
 0.3714 0.1294 0.2232 0.1836 
Notes: Robust standard errors, which are clustered by city, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. To reduce the space taken for tables, we only report 
the important coefficients in this table. 
 
